1 Feldstein also deals with a third case where the gross-of-tax rate of return is above g, but the net-of-tax rate is below g. Since the main purpose of this case is to make more plausible the situation where g is at least as large as the net rate of return, it is not necessary for me to deal with it separately.
2 The limitation of the steady-state growth rate of the public debt to g can be rationalized by assuming that the value of the outstanding stock of debt at any point in time is bounded by the government's collateral, which I assume can be measured by the present value of future taxing capacity. If taxes are limited to a fraction, T, of national income,y, then the present value, calculated at the current date t, of future taxing capacity is y(t)1(r -g) = zy(O)egt/(r -g). Hence, the government's collateral grows at rate g and is finite for any t if r > g. If government debt grew at a rate faster than g, then the outstanding stock would eventually exceed the government's collateral. future taxes would have to be levied to limit the growth of the government debt. ... For example, if ... the debt growls] at the rate of growth of the economy, taxes will be required to finance only the fraction [1 -g/r] of future interest payments" (p. 332). The last statement is correct but does not imply his conclusion that "only in the special case of a static economy (g = 0) is the present value of required future taxes equal to the present value of the debt itself" (p. 333). The fallacy is that the fraction, (1 -g/r), applies to a base that is larger (increasingly over time) than it would have been if the debt had remained constant rather than growing at rate g.
Consider an initial debt issue of amount B (0) and a path of subsequent issues that make the outstanding stock of debt grow at rate g. Hence, B (t) B (O)egt, and the amount of debt finance at any date t > 0 is dB/dt = gB (t). Taxes levied at date t are the amount needed to finance interest payments net of debt finance, rB (t) -gB (t). The present value of these future taxes, discounted at rate r, is Hence, as would be expected, the present value of the future taxes coincides with the amount of the initial debt issue for any growth rate g (as long as g < r). Therefore, the presence of growth in the economy (at a rate below r) leaves unchanged the conclusion that government bonds are not net wealth. Consider, now, the second case where r < g. (The situation with r < g in a steady state implies inefficient capital overaccumulation, as discussed in Phelps [1966] .) In this case it is possible to finance all of the future interest payments without incurring any future taxes by having the debt grow forever3 at rate r.4 In this situation, where r < g in a steady state, it appears that debt issue would be regarded as net wealth and would therefore raise aggregate demand. Further, it seems that a sufficient amount of debt issue would cause enough of a shift from saving to consumption so that the steady-state rate of return would be raised to (just) exceed the growth rate.
3 In one respect this possibility hinges on an infinite horizon-any finite truncation (corresponding, say, to a fixed date for the end of the world or to an exogenous liquidation date for the debt) would restore equality between the present value of taxes and the amount of initial debt. On the other hand, an individual's effective horizon for capitalizing taxes would also not be infinite if intergenerational transfers were not (expected to be) operative for some generations far in the future. In this sense it is the relative values of the horizons for the world and the individual that are important, rather than whether either is infinite. A further consideration, pointed out by Starrett (1970) , is that the end of the world, if it is anticipated, is presumably stochastic. Starrett argues (p. 709) that a stochastic end of the world is equivalent to an infinite horizon with an appropriate specification of the discount rate applied to future utilities. 4 The debt could also grow at rates above r to finance a continuing flow of transfer payments. The government's collateral, as calculated in n. 2 above, is now infinite.
The important issue is whether the economy would ever be in a steady state where r < g. The reason that government debt issue can move the economy out of this situation is that the government's collateral, which grows at rate g over an infinite horizon (see n. 2), allows the debt to expand forever at rates at least equal to r. Are there any private individuals or institutions that would have a similar capacity and incentive in the absence of government intervention? In the overlapping-generations models of Diamond (1965) and Cass and Yaari (1967) , there are no economic units with a sufficiently long time perspective to engage in this type of activity, so that a competitive equilibrium with r < g in a steady state is possible. On the other hand, in a model of a utility-maximizing immortal family, as in Sidrauski (1967) , the solution with r < g in a steady state would be untenable. In this situation the family would be motivated to play the same game as the government by issuing debts in exchange for current consumption, financing these debts by allowing them to grow at a rate at least equal to r but not higher than g-a rate that would not exceed the growth rate of the family's collateral and thereby never reducing future consumption.5
Hence, a competitive equilibrium would have to be in the (efficient) region where r > g in a steady state. In a situation with finite-lived individuals, it seems that operative intergenerational transfers would play an equivalent role. In particular, when r < g in a steady state, transfer payments from young to old (which I referred to as arising from a "gift motive" in my earlier paper) that grow at a rate at least equal to r but not higher than g would be feasible in the sense that the ratio of transfers to income would not grow over time and would raise at least the present consumption level without reducing any future levels of consumption.6 It seems that the operation of these types of transfers would insure that a competitive equilibrium is in the (efficient) region where r > g in a steady state. My main hesitancy about this conclusion is that I have been unable to demonstrate that the transfer scheme, which can feasibly raise the consumption level of all family members (living in finite time) if r < g, would be consistent with utility maximization as viewed by each family member separately. (Hopefully, Brock and Scheinkman, well-known experts on the economics of infinity, will provide a final resolution of this question.) Accordingly, at this point I cannot rigorously rule out the existence of the case, r < g, in which debt issue would raise net wealth. Nevertheless, I
5 Thompson (1967, p. 1205) claims that a corporate firm, which has an infinite legal life, would be motivated to carry out similar policies. However, I cannot see why this policy is generally feasible, since the firm's collateral would not automatically grow at rate g; presumably, its net earnings are not a fixed fraction of national income. 6 Reductions of bequests from old to young would have an equivalent effect, but it seems that bequests would not be operative in a steady state where r < g, at least if bequests are motivated solely by concern for the utility of descendants (and assuming preference for a unit of own consumption over that of a descendant, starting at equal values of consumption per head).
would be surprised if many advocates of standard fiscal policy would be happy to rest the argument for the efficacy of such policy on the possible existence of this case.
Finally, Feldstein observes near the end of his comment that the effect of government bond issue on future generations is complicated and is therefore likely to be neglected by current generations. It is plausible that computational difficulties would add to individual uncertainty, and the model could be usefully supplemented to make that uncertainty explicit. However, it is much less clear that this complication would imply systematic errors in a direction such that public debt issue raises aggregate demand. One could argue at the same level of rigor that government deficits make people sufficiently nervous to reduce their consumption demand when taxes are replaced by public debt issue. As a general point it is difficult to identify a substitute for rational behavior as a basis for forming predictions in theoretical models. 
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